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Abstract
In the last decade, there has been a growing research focus on the subtle modifica-
tions of choice architecture that have strong effects on consumer behavior and are
subsumed under the term nudging. There is still little research, however, on how dif-
ferent nudges influence individuals with different personality characteristics. An
experimental online shopping scenario is used to test whether a customer's Need for
Cognition and Need for Uniqueness moderate the effectiveness of two of the most
prominent nudges—defaults and social influence. Two experiments with samples strat-
ified by age, gender, and education (total N = 1,561) reveal that defaults and social
influence have the predicted impact on a customer's decision. Across both studies,
nudge effectiveness was partially impacted by Need for Cognition and not impacted
at all by Need for Uniqueness. These findings imply that both types of nudges are
strong and robust techniques to influence consumer decision-making and are effective
across different levels of consumer's Need for Cognition or Need for Uniqueness.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, a vast amount of research has examined the influ-
ence of small modifications in the choice architecture on consumer
choice behavior, a concept commonly referred to as “nudging.” The
term “nudge” was popularized by the bestseller “Nudge” by Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein and can be defined as “any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their eco-
nomic incentives” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Many different
interventions and techniques derived from research in psychology,
behavioral economics, information systems, and other disciplines can
be subsumed under this broad definition, such as defaults, social influ-
ence, warnings, reminders, or simplifications, just to mention a few
(Sunstein, 2014). In the specific context of influencing consumer
choice behavior, online retailers may want to use these nudges to
push customers into buying specific products, for example, environ-
mentally friendly products (Demarque, Charalambides, Hilton, &
Waroquier, 2015).
Despite the relevance of nudging for consumer choice behavior
and their wide-spread implementations in practical settings, there is
still only few research on whether the effectiveness of these nudges
depends on an individual's personality (Jung & Mellers, 2016; Otto,
Clarkson, & Kardes, 2016; Stutzer, Goette, & Zehnder, 2011). How-
ever, the study of personality is relevant for both, practical and theo-
retical purposes:
From a practical standpoint, a moderation by personality would
indicate that for specific subgroups of individuals nudges may be inef-
fective (e.g., Thunström, 2019). In extreme, for certain subgroups
nudges could even backfire, leading to an outcome opposite than
intended. As an example, Thunström, Gilbert, and Ritten (2018) stud-
ied interindividual differences in expense aversion. They found that
people who were chronically low in experiencing pain when spending
(i.e., cost insensitive) did not normalize their spending behavior when
being exposed to an opportunity cost reminder nudge. Furthermore,
for individuals who were chronically high in experiencing pain when
spending (i.e., cost sensitive) the nudge backfired, leading to even
more restrictive spending behavior than typical for such individuals.
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Thus, interindividual differences were responsible for the absence or
even the backfiring of a nudging effect. Indeed, a growing body of
research shows that sometimes nudges remain ineffective
(e.g., Dimant, van Kleef, & Shalvi, 2020; John & Blume, 2018; Myers &
Souza, 2020; see also Sunstein, 2017) or even backfire (e.g., John &
Blume, 2018; Liu, Gao, & Agarwal, 2016; Marreiros, Tonin,
Vlassopoulos, & Schraefel, 2017; See, Valenti, Ho, & Tan, 2013; Wil-
son, Bogomolova, & Buckley, 2015). Overall, there is huge variation in
nudging effects (Hummel & Maedche, 2019; Jachimowicz, Duncan,
Weber, & Johnson, 2019). One reason for such unstable, ineffective,
and backfiring nudges could be the influence of personality traits.
Thus, studying the effect of personality could identify potential pitfalls
when applying certain nudges for specific subgroups. It could also
show how nudging interventions could be customized to the individ-
ual's personality in order to have a stronger impact on consumer
behavior.
However, the study of personality is also important from a theo-
retical perspective. The cognitive processes underlying nudges are still
a matter of debate (e.g., Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011;
Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017; Marchiori, Adriaanse, & De
Ridder, 2017). Whether a nudging effect is moderated by a given per-
sonality trait would therefore shed further light on why nudges yield
compliance. We will outline this in the following section.
2 | RESEARCH ON NUDGING
Over the last years, some nudges have received significantly more
attention in research and application than others. A current review on
nudging suggests that defaults are the most popular nudge with most
articles focusing on them (Hummel & Maedche, 2019). However, the
same review also shows that social influence nudges only fall shortly
behind in number of studies over the last years (Hummel &
Maedche, 2019). Overall, both defaults and social influence can be
seen as two of the most prominent nudging techniques (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008). Beyond their prominence, these two nudges are also
of particular theoretical interest in context of personality, as we will
argue in the remainder of this article. The present research therefore
elaborates on the effectiveness of these two nudges, dependent on
individual personality characteristics.
2.1 | Defaults
A default works by preselecting one of the options so that it is auto-
matically taken if no active choice is made. A default is then the
option that choosers obtain if they do nothing (Thaler & Sun-
stein, 2008). For a prominent example, consider the domain of organ
donation. In some countries, citizens need to register in order to
become an organ donator. In other countries, citizens are organ dona-
tor unless they specify otherwise. Importantly, in the latter countries
in which organ donator is the default, the rate of organ donators is
tremendously higher (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
Default effects are considered as a robust and well-established
strategy to influence choice behavior (Jachimowicz et al., 2019), and
they provide a powerful intervention for many different applied con-
texts like prosocial behavior, such as organ donation (Johnson &
Goldstein, 2003), blood donation (Stutzer et al., 2011), and research
participation (Paunov, Wänke, & Vogel, 2019a, 2019b), but also in
consumer behavior, such as the compensation of CO2 emissions
(Bruns, Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Klement, Jonsson, & Rahali, 2018;
Székely, Weinmann, & Vom Brocke, 2016) and consumer product
choices (Brown & Krishna, 2004).
On a theoretical level, several explanations for default effects
were offered over the last decades: First, defaults are expected to be
chosen because switching to other options induces the aversion of
losing the status quo (Dinner et al., 2011). Second, people draw infer-
ences from a default, for example, that it is the recommended option
(McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). Most importantly, however,
defaults are expected to work because of the reduced effort while
sticking at the default (Dinner et al., 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
The default allows for a choice without any deliberation, thus even
cognitive misers can make a decision (Dinner et al., 2011). We will
come back to this important point later.
2.2 | Social influence
Another popular form of nudging is to use the power of social influ-
ence (Hummel & Maedche, 2019). Social influence refers to changes
in attitudes, beliefs, and behavior due to the actions or comments of
other people (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Gilovich, Keltner, &
Nisbett, 2011). Thaler and Sunstein outline this principle with “follow-
ing the herd” and “doing what others do” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
Psychologists usually distinguish between normative (conformity to
be accepted and liked by others) and informational social influence
(conformity because behavior or opinions of others are used as infor-
mation what is right; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Social influence as a
nudge is usually implemented by providing descriptive norms about
what other people do, or injunctive norms about what is approved or
accepted by others (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). For example,
Goldstein and colleagues (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008)
could show that towel reusing behavior of hotel guests could be
increased by simply adding the information on a sign that the majority
of guests in that hotel room use their towel more than once. Most
importantly, many different studies have shown that social influence
nudges are very effective in influencing consumer behavior, for exam-
ple, to increase the willingness to pay for healthy food (Aldrovandi,
Brown, & Wood, 2015), to make people buy more eco-friendly prod-
ucts in online grocery stores (Demarque et al., 2015), to reduce energy
consumption (Allcott, 2011) or littering behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990),
or to alter user behavior in business intelligence systems (Kretzer &
Maedche, 2018).
In conclusion, both defaults and social influence are well-
established nudges that have proven to influence consumer behavior
in multiple areas. However, we believe that nudges do not have a
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uniform effect on all individuals. Similar to marketing messages, of
which the effect is dependent on the recipient, also the effect of
defaults and social influence might be dependent on the personality
of the consumer.
3 | WHICH PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS
ARE RELEVANT FOR NUDGING?
In this research, we want to focus on two specific personality dimen-
sions, the need for cognition (NFC), and the need for uniqueness
(NFU). In the following, we will shortly elaborate on these constructs,
how they are logically related to the nudging context—especially in
the consumer area—, and what predictions can be made for their
impact on default and social influence effects.
3.1 | NFC
The NFC is the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive
processing (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984). In that terms, it refers
to dispositional differences in intrinsic cognitive motivation
(Fleischhauer et al., 2010).
NFC is a key moderator in psychological dual-processes in per-
suasion (Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009; Vogel &
Wänke, 2016) and is therefore a very important construct in con-
sumer behavior (e.g., Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992; Wood &
Swait, 2002). From the perspective of such dual-process models
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), one would expect that under low cognitive
or motivational resources heuristics have more impact on information
processing than when both types of resources are high. It has already
been shown in many different settings that high NFC—as a general-
ized disposition of cognitive motivation—weakens the impact of
superficial processing such as heuristics in the decision process
(cf. Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). In the same manner,
also defaults and social influence can be seen as simple decision heu-
ristics (Sunstein, 2018; Weinmann, Schneider, & vom Brocke, 2016)
that should work most effectively if people have a low cognitive moti-
vation to deliberately search and process the features of the choice
options (Carnevale, Inbar, & Lerner, 2011; Smith & Levin, 1996;
Verplanken, 1993). As an example, whether a position is shared by a
minority or majority can serve as a simple heuristic in persuasion
(Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; Darke et al., 1998; Maheswaran &
Chaiken, 1991). In a conclusion, weaker nudging effects from defaults
and social influence should occur for people with a high NFC.
However, one could also argue that this influence of NFC is par-
ticularly strong for defaults, out of the following considerations: First,
one core mechanism behind default effects posits that they work
because people do not want to invest the cognitive effort for making
an active decision (Dinner et al., 2011). In that terms, previous
research categorized defaults as system 1 nudges—nudges that rely
on uncontrolled and effortless thinking (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013;
Jung & Mellers, 2016; Loibl, Sunstein, Rauber, & Reisch, 2018). Hence,
people with a dispositional tendency to avoid cognitive effort—mean-
ing, with low NFC—should tend more to embrace any opportunity to
save the cognitive effort. Second, in contrast to social influence, a
default gives people with low cognitive motivation the chance to not
make a decision at all. Whereas social influence makes it necessary to
at least select the choice option that is endorsed by it, defaults do not
require any decision-making at all. Hence, the moderating influence of
NFC should be especially strong for default effects.
3.2 | NFU
One important personality variable in context of social influence is the
NFU, the “need to be different from others, to set oneself apart, and
to be special” (Schumpe, Herzberg, & Erb, 2016, p. 231). According to
uniqueness theory (Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980),
people aim at maintaining a balance between similarity and dissimilar-
ity to others. The central claim of the theory is, however, that there
are interindividual differences in the need to have dissimilarity,
namely the NFU (Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977).
Consequentially, people with high NFU are more resistant to majority
influence (Imhoff & Erb, 2009). Especially in the domain of consumer
behavior, NFU is an important personality dimension: People with
high NFU prefer scarce, customized, and less popular products
(Lynn & Harris, 1997a; Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Ruvio, 2008; Tian,
Bearden, & Hunter, 2001). Generally, individuals with high NFU seem
to be more resistant towards social influence by other people. Conse-
quently, social influence effects should also be weaker in our research
for people high in NFU. Crucially, for individuals with high levels of
NFU, social influence might even backfire, and lead to choices diverg-
ing from majority influences.
Interestingly, one could also speculate on an effect of NFU on
default effects: Default effects work partly due to social inferences—
people infer from a default that it is the recommended option
(McKenzie et al., 2006) and the option most people like and choose
(Everett, Caviola, Kahane, Savulescu, & Faber, 2015). However, as the
empirical basis is much weaker for such a speculation, we refrain from
formulating it as an explicit hypothesis.
3.3 | Summary and overview over the experiments
In a conclusion, we expect that both default and social influence
effects are weaker when people have a high NFC, but that this atten-
uating influence of NFC is stronger for default effects. We also expect
that that NFU lowers the impact of social influence.
To test these predictions, we conducted a first experiment
(Experiment 1) with an online shopping scenario where product
choices were directed by a default or by social influence. NFC should
moderate effects especially in the former, but NFU should moderate
it in the latter condition. In addition, we included a third condition in
which we combined both nudges, a default and social influence. The
combination of the two nudges was included because of a recent
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insight on the underlying processes behind default effects. At least in
some situations, defaults are perceived as the option most people
choose or like (Everett et al., 2015), and could therefore reflect a pro-
cess similar to social influence. However, we had separate hypotheses
for default and social influence regarding NFC and NFU. This presumes
that the two nudges operate by different processes and exert indepen-
dent effects. Thus, if both nudges indeed operate by different pro-
cesses, there should be an incremental effect of one nudge over the
other. If so, both personality traits may moderate nudge effectiveness
in this combined-nudge condition. Lastly, an incremental effect of one
nudge over the other would not only be relevant to our hypotheses,
but have important practical implications. That is default and social
influence nudges can be added up to maximize compliance rates.
After the shopping task with the nudges, NFC and NFU were
assessed.1 In a second experiment (Experiment 2), we replicated Experi-
ment 1 with a larger sample size, with another measure for NFU, and
an additional manipulation to increase a participant's processing depth.
4 | EXPERIMENT 1
4.1 | Design
Our study followed a three-group experimental design, in which par-
ticipants were assigned randomly to a default condition, a social influ-
ence condition, or a condition with both nudges present. In order to
separate preexisting preferences and nudging effects, we used a stan-
dard counterbalancing design. Thus, in each experimental condition,
half of the participants was nudged towards one option (later referred
to as product set A) and the other half of participants was nudged
towards the other option (later referred to as product set B). Doing
so, a priori advantages for a given product of being chosen (e.g., pre-
existing preferences for set A over set B) would cancel each other
out. Consequentially, in absence of a nudging effect, the nudged
option should be picked at chance level of 50%. At the same time,
choosing the nudged option in more than 50% of the cases would
indicate that the nudge intervention was successful. Likewise, a back-
fire effect would be evident if the nudged option was chosen below
chance level. Therefore, a fourth group with no nudge being displayed
was not needed and allowed us to reach a higher statistical power.
4.2 | Procedure
Participants were instructed to imagine that they had invited friends for
dinner, but six grocery products were still missing. An online grocery
store could deliver the products still in time. Participants were
instructed to project themselves into the role of this customer who
would now try to buy the specific products in this online grocery store.
Before the actual shopping task and to ensure data quality, two
multiple-choice questions checked whether participants had read the
instructions. If one of the answers was wrong, participants were
directed back to the scenario description.
In the shop, participants could navigate between the product cat-
egories via a tab menu (see Figure 1). For each category, two different
products were available. The order of the product categories in the
shop as well as of the products within a category were randomized
for each participant.
In the default condition, one product per category was already
preselected. In the social influence condition, one product per category
was presented as the product with the highest customer recommenda-
tion rate of this specific category. In the combination condition, both
nudges were applied on the same product. For a pure test of our nudge
manipulation (vs. a preference for specific products), we
counterbalanced which of the products in a category was nudged. Par-
ticipants could only proceed to the basket once one product per cate-
gory was selected. After clicking the button to proceed to the basket,
participants were presented with a summary of the purchased prod-
ucts, in which they could check and potentially revise their choices. We
took these final choices as dependent variables in our study.
After the shopping task, participants filled out a short awareness
check and indicated their attitudes towards the products. Finally, par-
ticipants were directed to the second part of the study, where they
filled out personality questionnaires for NFC and NFU. After that, par-
ticipants were thanked and dismissed.
4.3 | Materials and questionnaires
4.3.1 | Products
All products were displayed with a picture and a short description. The
shop including all products was pretested to make sure the scenario
was understandable and the products in each category were approxi-
mately equal regarding consumers' preferences. The product categories
were tomatoes, bananas, bread, coffee beans, milk, and pasta.
4.3.2 | Personality assessment
We used established German versions of the NFU-g scale with
26 items (Schumpe et al., 2016), the NFC Scale with 16 items (Bless,
Wänke, Bohner, Fellhauer, & Schwarz, 1994) to assess NFU and NFC.
Intercorrelation, internal consistencies (Cronbach's α) and descriptive
statistics can be found in Table 1.
4.4 | Sample
Our sample size was determined in an a priori power analysis for mul-
tilevel logistic regressions with a tool from Astivia, Gadermann, and
Guhn (2019). More details on the calculated model can be found in
the Section 4.6. From previous studies with the paradigm, we had
rough approximations of some parameters (intercept variance ≈ 0.8;
b0 ≈ 0.35). For the influence of personality, we conservatively
expected a small main effect (b = −0.25) and pursued a power of .9
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for this parameter, leading to a sample size of approximately 500 par-
ticipants. This sample size is also sufficient for stable estimations of
personality effects (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013).
Thus, we recruited a total sample of N = 519 German partici-
pants via a commercial online panel. Our sample was heterogenous
and representative concerning age, gender, and education. 47.6%
were female, the rest male. Participants' age (M = 45.81, SD = 13.3)
ranged from 18 to 69 with an approximately uniform distribution.
28.13% of our participants had lower secondary education,
31.60% had a high school diploma, 19.27% had mastered A level
education and 20.0% had a university degree. Participants received
0.5 EUR (~0.56 USD) as compensation for a mean duration of
~10 min.
4.5 | Results: Nudging effects
As measurements were nested within participants and outcomes were
binary, we ran a binary logistic multilevel regression model using the
glmer procedure of the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, &
Walker, 2015). Our model included random intercepts for the partici-
pant to account for the dependence of observations on participants.
We recoded our dependent variable such that it indicated whether
the nudged option was chosen (0 = chosen non-nudged; 1 = chosen
nudged). As nudges were applied on either product set A or product
set B, choices of the nudged option above 50% indicate a successful
nudging effect. We used a coding scheme with two dummy variables
where the default condition served as a baseline, the first dummy
coded the effect of the social influence condition (default = 0, social
influence = 1; combination = 0), and the second dummy coded the
effect of the combination (default = 0, social influence = 0, combina-
tion = 1). How many times people chose the nudged option is visual-
ized in Figure 2.
Our analysis revealed a significant intercept, b = 0.51, SE = 0.09,
z = 5.40, p <. 001, indicating that the likelihood of choosing the
defaulted product was above chance in the mere-default condition. In
the social influence condition, the likelihood of choosing the nudged
product was slightly reduced as compared to the default condition,
b = −0.19, SE = 0.13, z = −1.42, p = .155. In this condition, participants
also chose the nudged product above chance level, b = 0.32, SE = 0.10,
z = 3.35, p < .001. In addition, the combination group chose the
F IGURE 1 Screenshot from
the online grocery store in the
combination condition. In the
other conditions, only the
preselection or the social
influence cue were applied
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 1 Intercorrelation, internal consistencies (main diagonal),
and descriptive statistics of both personality variables in Experiment
1 (N = 519)
1 2
1. Need for cognition (.86) .42***
2. Need for uniqueness (.76)
M 4.5 3.26
SD 0.92 0.42
Note: For need for cognition, the scale ranged from 1 to 7; for need for
uniqueness, the scale ranged from 1 to 5.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .01, two-sided testing.
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nudged product significantly more often than the default condition,
b = 0.37, SE = 0.14, z = 2.77, p = .006.
4.6 | Effects of personality
For testing the influence of personality, we standardized all personal-
ity variables and ran the same models including NFC and NFU. We
used separate models that included one personality variable and all
corresponding interaction terms. The parameter estimates can be
retrieved from Table 2. Due to our coding scheme, the slopes of
NFC/NFU reflect the effect in the default condition. The interactions
term signal any changes of this slope in the social influence or the
combination condition.
Consistent with our reasoning, NFC had a small negative impact
on nudging effects in the default condition, b = −0.19, SE = 0.10,
z = −1.97, p = .049. Thus, compliance was less likely if NFC was high.
The two-way interactions involving NFC, however, were not signifi-
cant, indicating that the effect of NFC was not significantly different
in the other conditions.
However, NFU did not influence nudging effectiveness in the
default condition. In lack of any significant interactions, this was not
different in the social influence condition, with a simple slope of
b = −0.03, SE = 0.09, z = 0.30, p = .763. In addition, we computed sim-
ple correlations between choices and personality traits within condi-
tions, reported in the Online Supplementary.
4.7 | Interim discussion
In Experiment 1, we found a significant default and social influence
effect, and even an incremental effect of both nudges in combination.
In addition, we found a small effect of NFC on default effectiveness,
and no influence of NFU on any nudging effects. As the effect of NFC
was only slightly below the critical 5% threshold, and it is difficult to
interpret null findings for NFU in a single experiment, we decided to
replicate Experiment 1, addressing and improving certain limitations
of the first experiment:
First, despite a satisfying internal consistency of .76 in our data,
some items of the NFU scale correlated negatively with others.
Exploratory analyses revealed that indeed one sub-facet of the scale
was negatively or uncorrelated with the other two. Hence, null results
might come from the fact that the scale did not work in the intended
way. In addition, the NFU-g scale is conceptually broad, and there are
other measures that have been shown to be more related to con-
sumer behavior (Lynn & Harris, 1997b; Lynn & Snyder, 2002). In order
to tackle this, we used the four item version of the Self-Attributed
NFU scale (Lynn & Snyder, 2002) and translated it to German for
Experiment 2.
Second, we found a small tendency for NFC to influence general
nudging effectiveness in Experiment 1. In order to be certain about
the presence or absence of the effect, we increased the sample size
to a total amount of N = 1,042 participants for experiment 2.
Lastly, one may argue that the small observed effect of NFC was
not due to differences in cognitive processing but a third unknown
variable. Thus, as proof of concept, we assessed in Experiment 2 if
people high in NFC indeed engaged in deeper processing. In order to
have more than mere correlative evidence, we also actively manipu-
lated processing depth in Experiment 2. From our theorizing one
would expect a moderating impact not only of dispositional, but also
of situational cognitive motivation. Hence, if NFC actually has an
effect on nudging effectiveness, manipulating the processing depth
should lead to a similar outcome, providing further support for our
theoretical reasoning.
F IGURE 2 Choice of the nudged option depending on condition.
Due to our counterbalancing, percentages above 50% indicate a
successful nudging effect. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals (N = 519)
TABLE 2 Multilevel binary logistic regression models using
personality variables to predict the choice of the nudged option in
Experiment 1 (N = 519)
Model NFC Model NFU
Source b SE p b SE p
Intercept 0.53 0.09 <.001 0.51 0.09 <.001
SI −0.21 0.13 .118 −0.19 0.13 .154
CO 0.35 0.13 .009 0.37 0.14 .007
NFC −0.19 0.10 .049
NFC × SI 0.07 0.13 .590
NFC × CO 0.12 0.14 .403
NFU −0.04 0.09 .632
NFU × SI 0.01 0.13 .910
NFU × CO 0.01 0.14 .956
Note: The positive intercept signals nudge effectiveness above chance
levels in the default condition, the SI and CO dummy reveal differences in
nudge effectiveness from the default condition.
Abbreviations: b, regression weight; CO, combination dummy; NFC, need
for cognition; NFU, need for uniqueness; SE, standard error; SI, social influ-
ence dummy.
6 INGENDAHL ET AL.
5 | EXPERIMENT 2
5.1 | Procedure and design
Our study followed the same procedure and design as Experiment
1, except for the following changes:
First, we varied the processing depth (deep vs. standard)
between participants. In the deep condition, we provided an addi-
tional information on the scenario page, highlighted in red: Partici-
pants would have to write a short text where they would discuss
their product choices. Their arguments would be rated by an expert
committee and later used to improve the design of the shop. Partici-
pants in the standard condition merely received the information that
they would answer some questions regarding themselves after the
shop. We added an additional control question on the additional
information and only forwarded participants to the shop that
answered it correctly. Immediately after the shop, we asked partici-
pants of both conditions to write a short text on their product
choices and why and how they made them. On the next page, we
tested participant's memory on the choice options by asking six mul-
tiple choice questions, each with one correct and four distractor
items.2 After that, the procedure was identical to Experiment
1, except for substituting the NFU scale with the four-item SANU
scale. Intercorrelation, internal consistencies (Cronbach's α) and
descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3.
5.2 | Sample
We recruited a total sample of N = 1,042 participants via the same
commercial online panel as in Experiment 1. Again, our sample was
heterogenous and representative concerning age, gender, and educa-
tion. 45.97% were female, the rest male. Participants' age (M = 48.81,
SD = 12.99) ranged from 18 to 83 with an approximately uniform dis-
tribution. 16.12% of our participants had lower secondary education,
31.29% had a high school diploma, 22.46% had mastered A level edu-
cation and 29.85% had a university degree. Participants received 0.5
EUR (~0.56 USD) as compensation for a mean duration of ~10 min.
5.3 | Results: Processing depth
We used a multimethod approach to validate our assumptions on
processing depth.We first correlated participants' NFC score with the time
spent in the shop, r(1040) = .09, p = .003, the character length of their writ-
ten texts, r(1040) = .16, p < .001, and the memory on the choice options, r
(1040) = .17, p < .001. Next, we compared the processing depth conditions
on the same three measures as a manipulation check. Participants in the
deep condition, M = 181.02 s, SD = 201.15, spent significantly more time
in the shop than in the standard condition, M = 147.81 s, SD = 148.61, t
(914.21) = 3.01, p = .003. Both conditions also differed in the character
length of their written texts, which was significantly longer in the deep con-
dition,M = 197.03, SD = 200.99, than in the standard condition,M = 97.34,
SD = 104.61, t(737.1) = 9.92, p < .001. Last, we compared both conditions
regarding their memory on the choice options, which was not significantly
different in the deep condition,M = 0.44, SD = 0.24, and the standard con-
dition,M = 0.42, SD = 0.24, t(1040) = 1.44, p = .151.
5.4 | Results: Nudging effects
We used the same analysis strategy as in Experiment 1, except that
we added the additional factor processing depth as a dummy-coded
variable into the model. How many times people chose the nudged
option, is visualized in Figure 3.
Again, our analysis revealed a significant intercept, b = 0.46,
SE = 0.10, z = 4.57, p <. 001, replicating the default effect of Experi-
ment 1 in the standard condition. In the social influence condition, the
likelihood of choosing the nudged product was not different, b = 0.02,
SE = 0.14, z = 0.18, p = .855. Also, the combination group chose the
nudged product significantly more often than the default condition,
b = 0.37, SE = 0.14, z = 2.66, p = .008. However, neither the main
effect of processing depth, b = 0.04, SE = 0.14, z = 0.31, p = .755, nor
TABLE 3 Intercorrelation, internal consistencies (main diagonal),
and descriptive statistics of both personality variables in Experiment 2
(N = 1,042)
1 2
1. Need for cognition (.87) .15***
2. Need for uniqueness (.86)
M 4.58 2.41
SD 0.93 0.83
Note: For need for cognition, the scale ranged from 1 to 7; for need for
uniqueness, the scale ranged from 1 to 5. The mean of need for unique-
ness is lower than in Experiment 1 due to employing another scale.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .01, two-sided testing.
F IGURE 3 Choice of the nudged option depending on condition
(Experiment 2). Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval
(N = 1,042)
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the interaction with the social influence dummy, b = −0.04, SE = 0.20,
z = −0.21, p = .834, nor the interaction with the combination dummy,
b = −0.02, SE = 0.20, z = −0.11, p = .915, were significant. Hence,
processing depth did not change the effectiveness of the nudges.
5.5 | Effects of personality
For testing the influence of personality, we used the same approach
as in Experiment 1, except for adding the dummy variable for
processing depth and all corresponding interaction terms. The results
are displayed in Table 4.
Contrary to our expectations and to the results of Experiment 1, there
was no significant effect of NFC on nudging effectiveness. A marginally
significant effect emerged in the default condition in which people were
motivated to process the content. However, this trend pointed into the
opposite direction. If anythingNFC increased default compliance. Same as
in Experiment 1, there was no effect of NFU in terms of main effects or
interactions either (see Table 4). Simple correlations between nudge effec-
tiveness and personality can be found in theOnline Supplementary.
6 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
Despite the ongoing popularity of nudging—small modifications of choice
architecture with strong effects for example, on consumer behavior—
there is barely any research on the influence of personality traits on
nudge effectiveness. Based on previous theorizing and research on the
two popular nudges defaults and social influence, we expected that peo-
ple with higher NFC showweaker social influence and default effects and
people with higher NFU show weaker social influence effects. In order to
test this, we ran two large-scale online experiments with a grocery shop
setting that used defaults, social influence, or the combination of both.
After that, we assessed participants' NFC and NFU.
Our results revealed significant default and social influence effects in
both experiments, and also that the combination of both nudges leads to
stronger nudging effects than each nudge individually. As such, they add to
the growing body of evidence on nudges in general, and to the additive
nature of defaults and information, in particular (Paunov et al., 2019a,
2019b) However, we only find aweak influence of NFC in Experiment 1 on
default effectiveness that could not be replicated in Experiment 2. Hence,
we conclude that if NFC has an impact on nudge effectiveness it is very
small3 and that nudges are effective even for high NFC individuals. Corre-
spondingly, our manipulation of processing depth in Experiment 2 did not
impact nudge effectiveness. In addition, in both experiments NFU had no
impact on nudge effectiveness. In the following,wewill first discuss the the-
oretical implications, and then address practical implications, but also limita-
tions of our research.
6.1 | Theoretical implications
Despite mixed evidence, our results can also enhance our knowledge
on the underlying processes behind default effects:
TABLE 4 Multilevel binary logistic regression models using personality variables to predict the choice of the nudged option in Experiment 2
(N = 1,042)
Model NFC Model NFU
Source b SE p b SE p
Intercept 0.45 0.10 <.001 0.46 0.10 <.001
SI 0.04 0.14 .774 0.02 0.14 .868
CO 0.39 0.14 .005 0.38 0.14 .008
PD 0.07 0.14 .635 0.05 0.14 .745
PD × SI −0.07 0.20 .710 −0.04 0.20 .840
PD × CO −0.07 0.20 .746 −0.02 0.20 .915
NFC −0.05 0.09 .621
NFC × SI −0.05 0.13 .729
NFC × CO −0.15 0.14 .304
NFC × PD 0.24 0.14 .081
NFC × PD × SI −0.23 0.19 .236
NFC × PD × CO −0.19 0.20 .348
NFU −0.02 0.11 .815
NFU × SI 0.09 0.14 .541
NFU × CO 0.05 0.14 .754
NFU × PD 0.07 0.14 .610
NFU × PD × SI −0.10 0.20 .621
NFU × PD × CO −0.06 0.20 .769
Abbreviations: b, regression weight; CO, combination dummy; NFC, need for cognition; NFU, need for uniqueness; SE, standard error; SI, social influence
dummy.
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First, default effects have not only been explained by a reduction
of effort (Dinner et al., 2011), but also by other, and potentially more
cognitively demanding processes. As an example, defaults also work
because people infer from a default that it is the recommended and
socially approved option (McKenzie et al., 2006; Everett et al., 2015;
see also Leong, Yin, & McKenzie, 2020). It is well possible that both
processes—a reduction of cognitive effort and social inferences from
a default—were at work in our paradigm, and while the first process
was reduced by NFC, the latter one was augmented by it. As it is still
difficult to disentangle the different processes within a single para-
digm (Dinner et al., 2011), we can only speculate about this at this
point. Overall, our results are therefore inconsistent with the common
assumption that default effects are based on the reduced cognitive
effort while sticking at the default (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2002),
but point in a similar direction as recent findings on default effects,
showing that indeed cognitive effort is not the main driving mecha-
nism behind the phenomenon (Bruns, 2019; Jachimowicz et al., 2019).
Still, the fact that we consistently find default effects on consumer
choices in both experiments shows again that defaults have a major
impact on our choices. This implies that future research is also neces-
sary to gain more knowledge on the underlying processes behind
default effects, and also the specific conditions when the different
contributors to default effects are at work.
The previous argument suggests that default effects might not be
due to heuristic processing, for which a moderating effect of NFC is
expected from classical dual process models (Petty et al., 2009; Vogel &
Wänke, 2016). Alternatively, the processes behind defaults may depend
on the specific presentation of the default. For instance, people low in
NFC could be more prone to default effects if the default is hidden
rather than transparent (cf. Paunov et al., 2019a). Lastly, the problem
could also lie in the power of NFC in affecting different outcomes.While
findings from Experiment 2 indicate that NFC indeed goes together with
higher processing depth, these effects were rather small. Those small
NFC effects may therefore become evident in closely related dependent
measures (e.g., thoughts about options) but might be too weak to affect
more distal measures such a choice (also see Petty et al., 2009, for a dis-
cussion on heuristics in persuasion vs. heuristics in decision-making).
Regarding social influence and NFU, we based our reasoning on
the theoretical foundations of uniqueness theory (Fromkin &
Snyder, 1980) and previous research on interindividual differences in
NFU and consumer behavior. Again, our results provide additional evi-
dence for the impact of social influence on consumer behavior with
robust effects in both experiments. However, we find no moderating
effect of NFU on social influence. This result is puzzling but might fit
to previous literature that shows that the effect of NFU on consumer
behavior is bound to many moderators. As an example, Lynn and
Snyder (2002) discuss that the inconsistent effects of NFU on the
preference for scarce products depends on the measurement instru-
ment. Other researchers argue that giving reasons for the choices
beforehand is essential for NFU to influence consumer decisions
(Simonson & Nowlis, 2000), but that also additional moderators like
evaluation by others influence this process. Hence, we encourage
other researchers to continue the investigation of social influence and
NFU in the nudging context.
6.2 | Implications for practical purposes
Whereas our results do not match with our assumptions, the present
work has clear-cut practical implications: First and most importantly,
defaults and social influence have been shown again to influence con-
sumer choices, and give further evidence that policy-makers, online
retailers, or other choice architects can embrace nudging as easy but
effective modifications of choice architecture. Second, apparently two
of the most popular nudges were not majorly impacted by a con-
sumer's NFC or NFU in our experiments. This implies that both
nudges are very robust and work independent of the cognitive moti-
vation or uniqueness seeking of the people affected by the nudge.
Online retailers, as an example, do not need to consider their cus-
tomers' cognitive motivation, or uniqueness seeking, when designing
the choice architecture of their shops.
This reasoning also fits well with a second observation gained
from our results, regarding the combined use of nudges. So far, only a
few studies have examined the combined effect of two nudges
(e.g., Campbell-Arvai, Arvai, & Kalof, 2014; Paunov, Wänke, &
Vogel, 2020). Our results reveal that defaults and social influence
worked better than each nudge individually. This could signal that
despite overlapping processes in some situations (e.g., Everett
et al., 2015) both nudges operate independently and thus can be com-
bined in applied settings. However, this could also mean that the addi-
tional social influence information served as an explanation for the
default and thus increased its effectiveness. Indeed, recent research
shows that defaults are more effective when they are transparent, for
example, if their purpose is disclosed (Paunov et al., 2020; Paunov
et al., 2019a, 2019b). Hence, social influence information could also
work as a transparency cue justifying the default's presence. From an
applied perspective, most online stores already use recommendation
systems based on electronic word of mouth. Apparently, altering
choice architecture by additionally using defaults in line with legal
standards can have incremental effects on their customer's behavior.
Our results signal that at least these two nudges can be combined to
some extent to facilitate consumer choices. However, why exactly
this is the case remains uncertain, which brings us to limitations and
directions for further research.
6.3 | Limitations and directions for future research
This research has some limitations that may also provide opportunities
for future research. First, one point of criticism might be that partici-
pants did not make real choices. Thus, processing effort might have
been low in our studies. Though participants in the deep processing
condition of Experiment 2 spent more time studying the products,
and also produced more arguments about the products, there was no
clear effect on information recollection, nor on product choices. Like-
wise, NFC did not alter the nudge effects. It is therefore possible that
NFC effects become only evident, if participants make consequential
choices. However, research with hypothetical choices often yields the
same insights as research with real choices (Johnson & Bickel, 2002;
Madden et al., 2004; Wiseman & Levin, 1996). Still, differences in
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effect size and effects of other moderators are possible, which needs
to be examined in future studies.
Second, whereas we did not find any effect of NFU in both exper-
iments, one should be careful to make generalizations from that. First,
the NFU-g scale used in Experiment 1—despite being a published and
validated scale in German—behaved unexpectedly and therefore
makes the results from that study difficult to interpret. Although we
tackled this problem with another scale in Experiment 2, the results
were similar. However, as argued before, the theoretical mechanisms
behind NFU in the nudging context might be more complex and
depend on certain moderating conditions. As an example, it is possible
that the scenario of the experiments limited the influence of NFU, as
the products were bought for a dinner with friends and not for one-
self. Previous research suggests that the resistance to majority influ-
ences is stronger for domains people use to signal their identity
(e.g., music taste [Berger & Heath, 2007]). Future research should
therefore examine the influence of NFU for consumer products peo-
ple use to signal their identity (e.g., online stores for clothing).
Last, our results are limited to two specific nudges, and should not
be generalized to general nudging effectiveness. Nudging is a broad term
that subsumes lots of different interventions (Sunstein, 2016). We chose
defaults and social influence for our experiments because they can be
counted to the most commonly used nudges, but also because their
promising theoretical foundations. However, future research should also
examine other nudges and their dependence on personality traits.
6.4 | Conclusion
In the domain of consumer behavior, nudges can provide a cheap but
powerful tool to influence consumer decisions. However, research on
interindividual differences in nudging effectiveness is scarce. In order
to change this, we examined whether two of the most popular
nudges, defaults and social influence, depend on a consumer's NFC or
NFU. However, our results suggest that nudging effects are mostly
robust against any impact of both personality constructs. Hence, we
encourage practitioners to make use of these nudges to boost con-
sumer decisions, and researchers to use our studies as a first start to
also contribute to the field of interindividual differences in nudging.
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1 As an exploratory research question, we also examined if the Big Five
personality traits moderate the effectiveness of the nudges. In experi-
ment 1, we therefore assessed the short form of the BFI (Rammstedt &
John, 2007). Unfortunately, the reliabilities were very poor. We there-
fore refrain from a detailed consideration of these constructs in the
remainder of this article. Results for the Big Five are reported in the
Online Supplementary.
2 For the first N = 234 participants, we also assessed participant's memory
on the product names. Unfortunately, the answers could not be directly
related to the specific products because of a programming error.
3 We also performed a conservative sensitivity analysis using G-Power
(Faul et al., 2007), with the logistic regression interface as approximation.
Assuming a power of .8, our sample size of Experiment 2 would have
been sufficient to detect an effect of NFC in our model of d > .08 (based
on the tables provided by Chen, Cohen, & Chen, 2010).
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